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The Federalist Society Presents:

SHOWCASE PANEL II:
WHY, OR WHY NOT, BE AN ORIGINALIST?+
With an Introduction by Dean Reuter, Esq.

November 15, 2019
National Lawyers Convention
The Mayflower Hotel
Washington, D.C.

Featuring1:
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF
Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH
James Monroe Distinguished Professor of Law and Paul G. Mahoney Research
Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES
Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University Law
School
MODERATOR: HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

+
On November 15, 2019, the Federalist Society hosted the second showcase panel of the 2019
National Lawyers Convention at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC. The topic of the panel
was “Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?” There are a variety of arguments for following
originalism today, such as justifications rooted in language, positivism, sovereignty, and
consequences. This panel would look at many normative positions for and against originalism.
1. Please note that the Speakers have reviewed and edited this Transcript.

683

684

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69.4:1

TRANSCRIPT
DEAN REUTER: Good morning. Let’s get started if we could. Thank you
very much. I’m Dean Reuter, Vice President, General Counsel, and Director of
Practice Groups at The Federalist Society. Welcome and thank you all.
Welcome back, or welcome, as the case may be. This is the second and best day
of The Federalist Society National Lawyers Convention, so thank you for being
here. This is our showcase panel on “Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?”
And as Justice Kagan has said, and as we heard again last night, we’re all
originalists now.2 So one could wonder, if we’re all originalists, why do we
have a panel on or why or why not be an originalist? I’m interested to find that
out myself, so we’ll find out momentarily.
But I thought we had a great day yesterday, capped last night by what I thought
was a very personal and touching address by Justice Kavanagh, just splendid.
And I don’t think people in this room necessarily know, but that event was sold
out before we could advertise it. So it’s a good time to be in The Federalist
Society. And I apologize for the delay in getting into the room last night, into
the building. That was caused by a last minute security, a second security sweep
of the entire building. It turns out a security sweep that was almost perfect but
not quite perfect, as we did have one protestor in the room.
So the good news is that that protestor last night, if you were there—who tried
to interrupt the proceedings—she apparently did pay for her dinner ticket.
[Laughter]
Someone suggested it might be nice for us to take that money and do
something meaningful or useful with it. We charged $250 for dinner last night
for nonmembers, and I’m pretty confident she was not a member. So you all
know me. If you have a great idea of how The Federalist Society should spend
that $250, let me know. I was thinking staff bonuses, but you might have better
ideas.
[Laughter]
In terms of special things going on today, there’s an exhibit today upstairs in
the Rhode Island Room of one of the original copies of The Federalist Papers.
If you get a chance, you should really take a look. It’s going to be on display
tomorrow as well, but only part of the day tomorrow. So that’s the Rhode Island
Room upstairs. We’ve got more book signings today as well—but please don’t
sign the Federalist Papers upstairs—several panel discussions, and an address,
of course, by Labor Secretary Eugene Scalia. And then we’ll end the day with
an address by Bill Barr, the Olson Lecture.
One thing we’ve added this year—actually, we had it last year—is the
livestream of all of our proceedings, virtually all the proceedings. So I would
encourage folks to email and tweet your friends and family, let them know they
2. The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of
Elena Kagan, Nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States).
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can watch all these proceedings online. Just go to The Federalist Society
website, fedsoc.org.
With that, it becomes my duty to introduce our moderator, Judge Hardiman.
I’ve urged all our moderators to introduce their panelists very briefly, so I’m
going to introduce him only briefly by saying he’s a great friend of the
organization, a repeat performer here. And I welcome him. Please join me in
welcoming Judge Tom Hardiman.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Thank you, Dean. It is a great privilege for
me to be here to moderate this panel of outstanding thinkers and scholars. Our
first presenter this morning will be the Honorable Amy Coney Barrett. She has
served as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
for the past two years. She spent some time here in Washington serving as a law
clerk to Judge Laurence Silberman and Justice Antonin Scalia. She also
practiced law at Miller, Cassidy, Larroca & Lewin for three years before
returning to a place that is near and dear to my heart, the University of Notre
Dame. In 2002, Judge Barrett returned to her alma mater, where she became a
distinguished professor of law. In addition to her extensive duties on the Seventh
Circuit, she continues to teach at Notre Dame.
After Judge Barrett, we’re going to hear from Professor Richard Pildes. He’s
the Sudler Family Professor of Constitutional Law at NYU Law School. He’s
one of the nation’s leading scholars of constitutional law and a specialist in legal
issues concerning democracy. A former law clerk to Justice Thurgood Marshall,
Professor Pildes has been elected into the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences and the American Law Institute. He also received recognition as a
Guggenheim Fellow and a Carnegie Scholar. Professor Pildes authored an
acclaimed casebook on The Law of Democracy.3 And we’ll hear more from
Professor Pildes about the law of democracy during his remarks.
Our third presenter will be Professor Sai Prakash. He’s the James Monroe
Distinguished Professor of Law and the Paul G. Mahoney Research Professor of
Law at the University of Virginia Law School. A graduate of Stanford
University and Yale Law School, Professor Prakash clerked for, like Judge
Barrett, Judge Laurence Silberman here in Washington. And he also clerked for
Justice Clarence Thomas. A widely respected scholar of the separation of
powers in general and executive power in particular, Professor Prakash’s
forthcoming book, The Living Presidency: An Originalist Argument Against Its
Ever-Expanding Powers, will be published by Harvard University Press next
year.4
Last, but certainly not least, Professor Michael Dorf is the Robert S. Stevens
Professor of Law at Cornell Law School where he has taught since 2008. A

3. SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA KARLAN, RICHARD PILDES & NATHANIEL PERSILY,
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS (5th ed. 2016).
4. SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY: AN ORIGINALIST
ARGUMENT AGAINST ITS EVER-EXPANDING POWERS (2020).
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prolific author of more than 100 articles and essays, Professor Dorf is co-author
with Professor Laurence Tribe of On Reading the Constitution.5 A graduate of
Harvard College and Harvard Law School, Professor Dorf clerked on the Ninth
Circuit for Judge Stephen Reinhardt and on the Supreme Court for Justice
Anthony Kennedy.
In the grand tradition of The Federalist Society, we will have opening
statements of approximately ten minutes from each of our panelists, followed by
diverse opinions and vigorous discussion. We will conclude with questions, I
reiterate, questions, from the audience at the tail end of the presentation. So
without further ado, Judge Amy Barrett.
[Applause]
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Thank you, Judge Hardiman. I’m
delighted to be at the convention and on this panel this morning. I look forward
to a lively debate.
At bottom, I think one ought to be an originalist because the Constitution, no
less than a statute, is law. It’s not merely a statement of our aspirations, as some
have described it, nor, as others have said, is it simply a symbol of our political
culture’s commitment to the idea of fundamental rights. Those things are true
of the Declaration of Independence, a document that we revere. But the
Declaration does not bind us, and the Constitution does. It’s more than an
expression of political ideals. It has the force of law.
Why is the Constitution law? As an initial matter, the original Constitution,
along with each of its amendments, was adopted in an exercise of popular
sovereignty through a process self-consciously designed to create authoritative
law. And the authoritative law that the people created is the text that they
ratified. That text is what satisfied the onerous process of ratification. That is
what has supermajority buy-in. And if a constitutional provision became
authoritative because the people consented to it, then we need to know what they
consented to. And to discern that, we look at the meaning that the text had at
the time it was drafted and ratified.
Two features of our Constitution make that possible. The fact that it is written
enables us to identify the content of our constitutional commitments, and the fact
that the Constitution and its amendments become authoritative through a formal
process enables us to put the text in its historical context. The same isn’t true of
an unwritten constitution, for example, like the British Constitution. If
fundamental law grows through a largely unwritten tradition, it is difficult to pin
down its precise content, much less to isolate the moment at which any given
principle becomes fundamental law.
Our Constitution is structured differently. Its meaning was fixed at the time
it was written and formally adopted, and it stays the same until it is lawfully
changed. And this fixation of the text is part of our constitutional design because
it sharpens the constraint. The content of the commitment does not change even
5. LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991).
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if popular attitudes wax and wane. Even if a majority of the country thinks that
free speech is passé, the First Amendment stands.
Arguments that the text is authoritative raise a number of objections, but a
common one is the dead hand objection. We were not among the people who
ratified any of these constitutional provisions, nor, when some of these
constitutional provisions were ratified, would many of us have been able to
participate in their ratification. So why should we be bound to the text as those
who ratified it understood it?
This is more than an objection to originalism. It’s an objection to the
Constitution’s status as law. On this view, the Constitution has no claim on us
because we didn’t participate in the process of its adoption. But this idea doesn’t
really have purchase in real life. For example, we’ve recently seen criticisms of
the Electoral College and of equal representation in the Senate. But we don’t
see serious proposals to simply abandon the Electoral College in the next
election or to seat more than two senators from California.
We wouldn’t make either change without a constitutional amendment
because, in our ongoing society, each generation treats the law as authoritative
until it is lawfully changed. And the constitutional law that is handed down is—
I’m going to borrow this from Professor Stephen Sachs—the founder’s law plus
lawful changes.6 To figure out what the law is, we go to the source. We identify
the meaning of the text that the people ratified and account for any lawful
changes that have happened since.
Now, it’s indisputably true that a constitutional change is hard to come by.
The hurdles of the Article V process are steep. Does the difficulty of that process
mean that we’re stuck with the Founders’ law, no matter how much we might
want to change it? Or, put differently, is the Constitution a straitjacket? No.
For one thing, it bears emphasis that the Constitution itself leaves plenty of room
for change, political, legal, social, and otherwise. The Constitution is less than
6,000 words, and it makes no attempt to regulate every aspect of American life.
It leaves change largely in the hands of the states and of the political branches
of the federal government.
The Constitution may be hard to amend, but legislation is easier to pass. And
state constitutions are much easier to amend than our federal Constitution. As
Judge Sutton has reminded us, we have 51 imperfect solutions, not one.7 Our
Constitution is not supposed to be the mechanism by which we accomplish every
change, even significant ones.
Moreover, when the Constitution does speak, it does so through a mix of rules
and standards. That has given the Constitution the flexibility to last. It speaks
not only in specifics but also in generalities. And fidelity to the Constitution
6. Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
817, 819 (2015).
7. JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
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means respecting the level of generality at which the text is written, not to
transform standards into rules or vice versa. As Justice Scalia said, text should
not be construed strictly.8 It should not be construed leniently. It should be
construed reasonably to contain all that it fairly means.
Now, notwithstanding the ways in which the Constitution leaves us flexibility,
there is no denying that it also imposes constraints. After all, entrenching certain
values and structural features of government is the point. Is that reason to say
that we ought not be bound by this law, including by the mechanisms that it
proscribes for change? Again, no.
The difficulty of constitutional amendment is, in my view, one of the things
that enables us to hang together as a country. Amending the Constitution is
difficult not simply because Article V makes it so. It’s because the size and
diversity of our country makes supermajority buy-in very difficult to achieve.
But perhaps that’s okay. Having fewer, rather than more, national and
entrenched rules, thereby permitting regional differences to flourish, is
necessary in a country like ours. It’s remarkable, really, that the people of
Louisiana and California, of New York and New Mexico are able to live under
one constitutional roof.
We compare ourselves to Western European countries. But consider that
Germany, closest to us in size, is roughly 138,000 square miles and has a
population of roughly 83 million. The United States has a population of roughly
330 million and is roughly 3.8 million square miles. While I haven’t looked at
the statistics, I think it’s a pretty safe bet that we have more racial, cultural, and
religious diversity than any of our Western European peers or our Canadian
neighbors. The Constitution that we have may not be the one that we would
adopt if we started from scratch with our own constitutional convention today.
Then again, I’m skeptical that we would be able to agree on any constitution at
all today. But we do agree on the one that we have, as reflected by our continued
acceptance of it.
We treat our original Constitution as law, and we are right to do so. If we
abandon it, if judges or elected officials seize the authority to change it outside
of the lawfully proscribed process, then we’re imposing constraints on the
People to which they have not consented. And I think that undermines the ability
of the citizens of our very large and diverse country to live peaceably together
under one constitutional roof.
I’ll sum up by saying this: in keeping with the theme of “we’re all originalists
now,” the really interesting questions involve the mechanisms for lawful
constitutional change, not whether the Constitution binds. Identifying the level
of generality at which provisions are written, analyzing the authority of
precedent, and determining how one builds out the more general language of the

8. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23
(1997).
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Constitution are all areas in which a lot of fruitful debate is occurring. Thank
you.
[Applause]
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Up until now, I have largely avoided getting
caught in the crossfire of the debates between originalists and non-originalists.
In my academic work, I haven’t engaged extensively with the debates over the
proper method or methods of interpreting the Constitution. But now that this
event thrusts me onto that battlefield, maybe I can add a bit of a different
perspective to these debates by engaging them from a somewhat different
perspective, which as Judge Hardiman said, is the perspective of the substantive
body of law much of my work addresses—the body of law I call the “law of
democracy.”
Starting from a focus on the law of democracy, I want to raise the particular
question, for those who are originalists, whether originalism should be
understood as a complete theory of constitutional interpretation or only a partial
theory. More specifically, are there some domains of law that even originalists
do recognize or should recognize that are not and should not be governed by
originalism—that are, in fact, legitimately even anti-originalist?
Not
surprisingly, perhaps, I want to suggest one of those domains is the law of
democracy. This body of law is probably the most radically non-originalist body
of constitutional law that we have. It’s been deeply established for 50 years or
so now. Much of this law is widely accepted and not controversial, although
some aspects of it, of course, are.
Here is a list of just four of the fundamental building blocks of the law of
democracy, just to ensure that everyone knows what constitutional doctrines I’m
talking about. First, there is the Court’s recognition of the right to vote as a
fundamental right under the Equal Protection Clause, although this could easily
also be called an application of substantive due process.9 Second is the Court’s
recognition that grossly malapportioned legislative districts violate Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment—that is the
establishment of the one-person, one-vote principle.10
Third, there is the body of constitutional law that strikes down, under the First
Amendment, ballot access laws that make it unjustifiably difficult for third
parties or independent candidates to get onto the ballot—the doctrine that John
McCain benefited from when he challenged George Bush in the 2000 election
primary because New York law for decades had made it virtually impossible in
the Republican presidential primary for anyone other than the candidate the
party establishment had anointed even to get on the primary ballot.11 Fourth,
there is the corpus of constitutional law that recognizes that political parties have
constitutional rights that prohibit states from allowing, for example, independent
9. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
10. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–68 (1964).
11. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25 (1968).
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voters to vote in a party’s primary, even though the states can impose a primary
on the parties in the first place.12
I can’t explain in detail here why all of these doctrines are so dramatically
non-originalist. Nor have I included in this list of four central, non-originalist
areas of the law of democracy other constitutional doctrines in this area that
some would argue (while some would not) are more closely tied to the specific
text of the constitution, such as constitutional law decisions involving campaign
finance, racial vote dilution, or racial gerrymandering. I want to focus just on
key doctrines in this area that pose the most direct challenge to originalism. And
with respect to the four areas I’ve mentioned—constitutional protection of the
vote or access to the ballot box or the design of legislative districts or the role of
political parties—it is simply not easy to square any of these with the text of the
Constitution or with any version of originalism (whether that originalism focuses
on public understandings at the time the relevant constitutional provisions were
enacted, the expected application of those provisions, or original intent
understood more narrowly). Indeed it’s not even easy for non-originalists to
square this body of law with interpretive approaches based on the evolving
historical practices of American democracy. These lines of constitutional
development were more radical even than that.
The underlying reason it is difficult to square this body of law with originalism
or even some non-originalist approaches to interpretation stems from one of the
paradoxes of our Constitution. The paradox is that, precisely because we are the
oldest continuous constitutional democracy, the Constitution itself is remarkably
thin and underdeveloped when it comes to much of how the democratic process
and the frameworks for elections should be constructed. Many reasons exist for
that, including that the Framers could not anticipate certain aspects of how
democracy would develop. More modern constitutions frequently spell out in
detail issues concerning individual political rights, or the rights of political
parties, or the institutions that oversee the democratic process (such as
independent electoral commissions). But the text of our Constitution contains
much less than most Americans realize with respect to the basic rights and
structures of democratic process.
Most historians agree, for example, that the glorious Fourteenth Amendment,
for example, was not intended, or publicly understood, to include political rights.
Similarly, modern issues the Framers could not have anticipated did not even
arise until far later in our history. Constitutional issues concerning state
regulation of the ballot couldn’t even arise, for example, until the states began
to take over the process of printing an official state ballot, which didn’t happen
until the rise of the secret ballot in the 1890s. Once the state took over that
function, state regulation over access to the ballot inevitably followed, along
with concerns about state actors using that control for their own partisan
12. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581–82 (2000); United States v. Classic,
313 U.S. 299, 316–18 (1941).

2020]

Why, or Why Not, Be an Originalist?

691

advantage—which, in turn, generated questions about whether constitutional
doctrine had anything to say about this risk. Political parties were thought to be
anathema to the system the Constitution was designed to set up, the
quintessential form of Federalist No. 10’s faction.13 Yet, by the time of World
War II, almost all the new constitutions came to protect the rights of political
parties as one of the foundational principles of democracy; in the aftermath of
one party totalitarian states, two or more political parties competing for power
came to be understood as almost definitional of democracy—despite our
constitution not saying anything about political parties.
Moreover, much of the law of democracy, which began to be created in the
early 1960s, was born directly in the teeth of contrary constitutional text, or at
least so a textualist or an originalist might argue. The Elections Clause in Article
I, for example, gives Congress the power to regulate how congressional districts
are drawn.14 Thus, the text of the Constitution expressly empowered Congress
to end the massive malapportionment of congressional districts. That textual
grant of power to Congress played a role in the Court’s decisions, for many
decades, to treat malapportionment as a political issue, not appropriate for
judicial resolution.
But eventually, the Court learned something that the Framers couldn’t have
known. With the rise of political parties, members of Congress and state
legislators would come to share common political interests, common incentives,
and common fates. As a result, the vision that Congress would stand above and
independent of state legislative politics and serve as an effective institutional
check on practices like state-legislative manipulation of the way districts are
designed become unrealistic. One way of understanding the one-person, onevote doctrine that eventually emerged is that, once it became more clear how our
political institutions functioned after political parties became established, the
Court concluded that constitutional law needed to assume the role that congress
would not in ensuring that the way election districts are drawn does not
undermine a fundamentally fair and equal political process.
What should we call the approach to constitutional interpretation that justifies
the doctrines I’ve briefly described here, along with the rest of the law of
democracy? To offer a brief, single sentence answer to that I turn to none other
than Justice Scalia, who once wrote, “The first instinct of power is the retention
of power . . . .”15 That highly pragmatic, functional statement—surprising,
perhaps, from Justice Scalia—was offered to explain his then-dissenting view
that the Court should strike down a campaign finance law. More generally, that
statement suggests that one of the primary functions of judicial review is
precisely to provide a check against letting “the instinct to retain power” be
turned into legislation.

13. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
15. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Let me elaborate on Justice Scalia’s point. As a general matter, we know that
in any democratic system those who temporarily gain power will be tempted to
leverage that power into more enduring forms, through policies that entrench
themselves and their allies more securely in control. Those efforts might entail
using legislation to reduce competitive threats from opposition parties or using
temporary power to undermine the other checks and balances meant to hold
political power accountable.
If we had grown complacent about that threat, we just have to look at the rise
in formerly democratic countries today, for example, in Hungary and Poland, of
what’s been called electoral authoritarianism: governments that continue to hold
competitive elections, or at least nominally competitive elections, in order to get
legitimation from the political process, but use their power in office to capture
control of the courts, the media, and of the electoral process itself through
gerrymandering election districts and other structural manipulations that create
significant hurdles to meaningful political opposition.
This risk of political self-entrenchment that insiders will rig the system for
their own benefit is one all democracies face. We know that. That makes quite
powerful an understanding of judicial review that sees one of its most important
functions of judicial review to be the protection of democratic self-government
against these always-present risks, which cannot easily be protected against from
within the democratic process itself.
Is this a matter of constitutional interpretation? Shall we call this a
representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review, à la John Ely, or an
approach based on the Constitution’s underlying structures and relationships, à
la Professor Charles Black? Perhaps. But, rather than a matter of what might
be called interpretation, maybe this is even better understood as a matter of
applying principles constitutive of the very idea of government by consent that
we understand underwrites the Constitution as a whole: the idea that the coercive
power of the state is legitimate only when it arises through processes of political
competition not distorted through these kinds of manipulations of that process
by incumbent political forces.
Let me conclude by asking how originalist constitutional theory deals with
this major, but non-originalist, body of law? Others here can answer that perhaps
better than me. In general, I do not think that originalists have grappled much
yet with the law of democracy as a body of law—I don’t think non-originalists
have done enough of that either. But here are three option I can briefly identify
in the work of some non-originalists.
The first is flat out rejection: for originalists to deny the legitimacy of most or
all of the law of democracy. That is the approach Robert Bork appears to have
taken in The Tempting of America, but he only spends a couple of sentences on
this area of law.16

16. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
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The second option is a kind of partial accommodation, coming up with heroic
interpretations of the text to accommodate at least some of this body of law.
That’s what one of our best originalists, my friend Professor Michael
McConnell, has done to justify the Court taking on the issue of
malapportionment. He argues that the Republican Form of Government Clause
should be understood to bar the kind of malapportionment that existed before
the Court stepped in.17 But even that approach, which is designed to protect
effective majority rule, as he says, only deals with one aspect of the general
problem of self-entrenchment and not with the full range of anticompetitive laws
courts have struck down in the name of the First Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment to preserve the processes of democratic competition.
A third option for originalists is the one I suggested at the beginning: to accept
that at least some domains of our most important constitutional law are
legitimately not originalist or even anti-originalist. It is a simple reality of
democratic politics everywhere that a major risk to democratic self-government
is that those with power will use it to entrench themselves more deeply in power,
and, for that reason, one of the primary needs and justifications for
constitutionalism itself, and judicial review, is to protect the democratic process
against that risk.
Of course, even if this non-originalist justification is persuasive as a general
matter, we will still disagree in practice about how to apply judicial review in
concrete cases involving the democratic process. But unless originalists are
prepared to shut the door completely for any such role for the courts, we should
at least acknowledge some role for a non-originalist approach to constitutional
interpretation. Thank you.
[Applause]
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Well, it’s an absolute pleasure to be
here today. I’m very impressed with the size of the audience, and I’m honored
to be with these wonderful speakers. I can see many people in the audience that
know about as much about originalism as I do.
The topic today is, “Why, or Why Not, be an Originalist?” And it’s an odd
question to me because it’s a bit like asking why or why not be a human. I think
originalism—this is my first point—originalism is the natural way of
understanding utterances. I think Richard Fallon in his book, Implementing the
Constitution, writes that most of his students come to Harvard Law as
originalists.18 They try to understand what the law makers are trying to enact.
And he says most people are originalist. And I don’t know what happens to
those students once they leave Harvard Law School, but they came with the right
instinct. I was an originalist before I went to law school, before I went to college.

17. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: Original Mistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 105–06 (2000).
18. RICHARD H. FALLON, IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 13 (2001).
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You try to understand people’s utterances. You try to understand what they’re
trying to convey.
Law making is a form of communication. We’re trying to discern what the
law-maker’s trying to provide. If we’re honest with ourselves, we don’t try to
invest what meanings we prefer. Parents give instructions to children. If
children are manipulating the meaning of those instructions to serve their own
ends, they’re not really trying to understand what the parents are saying. That’s
not true interpretation. So I think Fallon is right. It’s the natural way of
understanding utterances.
It’s the natural way of understanding
communications. It’s the natural way of understanding law, as well.
And I think we can see this today. If you are fortunate enough to watch the
impeachment hearings, you will hear ad nauseum hundreds, if not thousands, of
times over the next several months “What did the Founders think about
impeachment?” Half of the Congress will say the Founders would have wanted
Donald Trump to be impeached because he’s committed high crimes and
misdemeanors. They’ll quote Article II, Section 4, which talks about “shall be”
impeached for the following high crimes and misdemeanors.19 And if you’re a
Republican, you’ll talk about perhaps the Founders rolling over in their graves.
This is not an impeachable offense, they will argue. But I’m not interested in
the specifics of the arguments.
My point is they’re both making this argument because it is precisely what
people expect. If a member of Congress goes up there and says, “We don’t really
care what this clause was meant to do. We just want to get rid of the President,
or we just want to save the President, come what may,” that’s just not a
legitimate argument in Congress, I don’t think, certainly not at this point. And
these sorts of arguments are going to be made because people expect to hear
them. In my view, the marks on a page, the utterances that people make are not
an invitation to readers or to listeners to generate meanings that are at variance
with what the speaker was trying to convey or what a reasonable reader would
take the text to mean.
My second point is that originalism is not about whether we should honor
some meaning. I think I perhaps disagree with Judge Barrett, with all due
respect. I think meaning is different and separate from decisions to act, to honor,
and to be bound by. In other words, saying what some text means does not
establish that we ought to abide by whatever injunction, cautions, and warnings
are in the text.
Using originalism, I can tell you what the Articles of Confederation mean.
That’s not a reason for us to follow the Articles of Confederation. I can tell you
about the 1788 Treaty of Alliance with France. That treaty is defunct, declared
by Congress as such during the quasi-war with France.20 A Canadian using
originalism can understand our Constitution. Obviously, the Canadian does not
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
20. Act of July 7, 1798, ch. 67, 1 Stat. 578.
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need to follow our Constitution or feel any allegiance to it. When talking about
some defunct law or expired law, I think we understand this. Not much turns on
the Fugitive Slave Clause. We can still figure out what it means. Not much
turns on it because of the Thirteenth Amendment.21
So in my view, originalism properly understood is not a normative theory. It’s
a theory of interpretation about what something means. I think I’ve gotten this
notion from Randy Barnett and Gary Lawson. It’s not a theory of normativity.
It’s a theory of what something means. And you need something else to decide
what to do with what the text means. So whether we should honor something
requires a normative theory.
Let me unpack that. Some people say that we should follow the Constitution
because it was adopted by means of popular sovereignty. I think Judge Barrett
said that, and other people have eloquently also made that sort of argument. But
I don’t think that follows. If the question is, “What does the Constitution
mean?”—I don’t think it follows that we should be originalists because it was
adopted by means of popular sovereignty.
It seems to me someone can be an originalist, someone can try to make sense
of a text, whether or not they agree with popular sovereignty. There will be
some people, call them libertarians, who may blanche at what comes through or
what emerges from a process reflecting popular sovereignty. And there’ll be
other people who have different points of view. So I think one can be an
originalist. One can be a believer in popular sovereignty.
One can also reject this Constitution on the grounds that it’s no longer a
reflection of the popular sovereignty of today. One can take the Jeffersonian
position that the Earth belongs to the living and that the past shouldn’t be able
to control the present, certainly not the past of 200 years ago. I agree with Judge
Barrett. It’s often said of originalism that it allows the past to control the present.
It really doesn’t. It’s a mode of interpretation. Whether you choose to be bound
by the past is up to you. It’s not ascribable to the theory of interpretation.
So again, if what I’ve said is true, originalism is a theory of interpretation. It’s
not a normative theory. And this takes me to my last point. I think the last point
reflects the curious position we’re in. Everyone in this country wants to say that
they subscribe to the Constitution, they believe in the Constitution. Then the
fight is, well, what do we make of it? I think originalists have on their side this
intuition that the meaning of the Constitution ought to be understood by
reference to what it meant in 1789, because, again, I think that’s the natural way
of understanding words.
And people that believe in change on and change in the Constitution on a more
progressive vision of the Constitution, they have cases and doctrines that many
people actually like. There’s a good portion of the country that likes much of
what the Warren Court did. There’s a good portion of the country that likes
some of the things that the more recent Court has done. And they’re able to
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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point to those things. Professor Pildes just did that. They’re able to point to
those things and say, “If you’re an originalist, you have to reject all these things.”
So what we see is a struggle, I think, over how to make sense of the words of
the Constitution to account for both of these impulses. And I think the
originalists have the idea that originalism is the natural way of understanding the
Constitution. And living constitutionalists have in their corner the idea that there
are many innovations in constitutional law that people favor. Many people
would favor some of the innovations that Professor Pildes mentioned earlier.
Let me end with two points. First, Justice Scalia wrote a wonderful article
called “Originalism: The Necessary Evil.”22 And I commend it to you. I think
the Justice was wrong. It’s not an evil at all. Interpretation is not evil. What
you do with a clause may or may not be evil. So the Fugitive Slave Clause has
a meaning. The Clause itself is evil, but the act of interpreting it is not. So I
think it was a mistake to talk about it as an evil. I think what he was trying to
suggest was, as compared to other ways of deciding cases or deciding meaning,
it’s less evil. But I don’t know why you would call originalism evil any more
than you would call interpretation evil. I don’t understand that.
And my second point is to end with a hypothetical. Suppose you’ve got a
grandfather on his deathbed, and he whispers to you, “Stay off the grass.” And
you promise to abide by his injunction. He smiles. He seems relieved, and he
passes. You know precisely what he means, what he meant to say. He was a
drug addict during the ‘70s, and he is telling you to stay off marijuana. But you
like to smoke marijuana. So you instead understand that command and your
faithfulness to it as a requirement that you stay off grass. You don’t play football
on grass. You play it only on artificial turf. You always use the concrete
pathways. You’re not really honoring your grandfather’s wishes, and you
should just give up the game. If you don’t want to honor it, don’t pretend that
your misinterpretation is what he was trying to convey.
To be clear, I’m not here to sermonize against marijuana. I’ve never inhaled.
I’m like the former President. But my point is it’s a mistake to misinterpret the
Constitution to achieve some end. Professor Pildes’ point, I think, is well-taken.
If you wish to pursue other ends, if you wish to salvage some portions of the
Court’s jurisprudence that you favor, you’re going to have to use something
other than originalism. Our jurisprudence is awash with non-originalist
doctrines. So thank you so much.
[Applause]
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I want to begin by thanking The Federalist
Society, Judge Hardiman for moderating, my fellow panelists, and all of you for
coming out here today.
My position on the question why or why not to be an originalist is first we
need to figure out what exactly it is we mean by originalism because, by my
count, there are originalisms, not a single originalism. I want to talk in particular
22. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
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about two lines of cleavage that one can see in the historical evolution of
originalism from its, if you will, original instantiation.
The idea that the original understanding of the words of the Constitution is
very important in constitutional interpretation is not originalism. That’s an idea
that is accepted across the jurisprudential ideological spectrum. What makes
originalism distinctive, it’s sometimes said, is the notion that those words are
determinative of the results in concrete cases.
But if you dig into that claim a little bit, however, you’ll see, that it can’t be
right for at least two reasons. One reason is that all originalists accept some
version of stare decisis. Even Justice Thomas, who is the Justice least
committed to precedent in the face of contrary evidence of the original
understanding, believes that precedent has some weight. More broadly, any
acceptance of stare decisis entails that sometimes a judge or justice will accept
a case as precedential even though it is inconsistent with the original
understanding. So then you need a further theory of when to be an originalist
and when to be somebody who, on prudential and pragmatic grounds, accepts
stare decisis.
The other reason to question originalism, understood as the claim that the
original understanding should be dispositive rather than just important, is that
the original understanding is often quite underdeterminate. Not always, of
course. Often it’s determinate. Judge Barrett gave a number of examples: two
senators per state. That’s pretty fully determinate. But there are all sorts of other
questions in which the original understanding of the text is underdeterminate.
Thus, even originalists are not going to be deciding cases simply in virtue of the
original understanding in all cases. So the proposition that what distinguishes
originalists from non-originalists is that originalists always follow the original
understanding, whereas non-originalists just think it’s relevant, doesn’t quite
work.
If originalism is not the view that judges should always accept the original
understanding as determinative, what is it? What makes originalism distinctive?
My view is that originalism is an ism. It’s an ideology. And to understand an
ideology, it’s helpful to think about where it came from. You can find numerous
statements in Supreme Court and lower court cases, and the treatises of opinion
writers throughout the nineteenth century into the twentieth century, talking
about the importance of original understanding, usually in terms of original
intent. To be sure, those uses sometimes meant by intent something different
from the subjective intensions and expectations of the Founders; they meant
something more like what we would call objective purpose.
In any event, even putting aside the difference between subjective intent and
objective purpose, you don’t really see what comes to be known as originalism
as a distinctive ideology until the 1970s and 1980s. It arises roughly
simultaneously with the birth of The Federalist Society, and for more or less the
same reason: both originalism and the early Federalist Society are reactions
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against what are perceived to be some of the excesses of the Warren Court and
the early Burger Court.
In the view of people who then called themselves originalists, the mostly
liberal Justices were using the Constitution to impose their own values to
accomplish what they were unable to achieve through the democratic process.
The core idea of the original originalism was to constrain constitutional
interpretation and thereby render it more legitimate. Many of the original
originalists coupled originalism with an ideology of judicial restraint. That’s
another somewhat ambiguous term, so let me add that as I’m using it here,
judicial restraint means that courts oughtn’t to strike down the outputs of
legislative and other majoritarian processes unless there’s a very clear answer in
the Constitution’s text and history. Long before originalism was a distinctive
view, the leading advocate of judicial restraint in constitutional interpretation
was James Bradley Thayer, who wrote a very influential article in the late
nineteenth century arguing that courts both practiced judicial restraint (which
was dubious as a descriptive claim) and should practice it, which was a
normative claim rooted in democratic principles.23 Thayerist justices practicing
judicial restraint will not invalidate the outputs of majoritarian processes unless
they’re convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that that’s what is required.
But modern originalism is not coupled with judicial restraint. At some point
originalists came to reason like this: “As long as we’re being bound by the
Constitution’s original meaning, we don’t also have to be judicially restrained.
So we can use the Constitution as a sword, not just as a shield. We can use
originalism to strike down laws that we think are unconstitutional as inconsistent
with the original meaning.” Cases finding a right to individual ownership and
possession of firearms, the modern federalism decisions, state sovereign
immunity, campaign finance are all instances of the Court ostensibly using the
original understanding to support striking down laws.
Does originalism entail judicial restraint? It originally did. It doesn’t
anymore.
Now I want to pose a different question about what originalism entails:
whether one should look at the original, subjective expectations and intentions
of the founders, including some combination of the people who attended the
1787 Philadelphia Convention, those who attended the state ratifying
conventions, and the general public? Should we ask what they had in mind with
respect to concrete cases? Or, alternatively, should we ask a different question,
one about what is often called original public meaning? This alternative
approach looks at the semantic content of the words of the Constitution rather
than the subjective intentions and expectations of the drafters, ratifiers, and
general public.

23. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law,
7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893).
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Over the last twenty to thirty years the vast majority of academic originalists
have shifted from subjective intentions and expectations—”stay off the grass”
means “don’t smoke the marijuana,” to use Professor Prakash’s example—to
objective public meaning. In a moment, I’ll critique original public meaning,
but first I want to acknowledge that there were good reasons why originalists
moved from subjective expectations and intentions to public meaning. I’ll
discuss four such good reasons for the shift.
First, as a general matter, we believe that the law should be comprehensible
to the public and that the law consists of the authoritative utterances of the
legitimate lawmaking bodies. The law is the authoritative utterances of the lawmakers, meaning the words, not what the law-makers might have had in their
heads. That’s true not just of constitutional interpretation. It’s true of statutory
interpretation as well.
Second, the obligation to focus on the utterances rather than the intentions or
expectations behind them is especially pressing, given the historical process that
gave rise to the Constitution. The Convention met in secret. We didn’t get
Madison’s notes until fifty years later. The Framers quite self-consciously
adopted a procedure by which we wouldn’t be looking to what they had in mind.
Rather we look to what was ratified.
Third, what makes the Constitution law, at least originally, was a process that
was very wide open in which people had divergent intentions and expectations.
There were ratifying conventions in each of the states. There were many
different people expressing different views. In order to find something on which
we can agree, it makes sense to look at original public meaning rather than
subjective expectations and intentions because you’re more likely to find a
shared understanding on meaning than you are as to expectations and intentions.
As an illustration of that phenomenon, just think about some of the questions
that vexed the early Republic, such as whether the first bank of the United States
was valid. This was an issue that divided the Washington administration.
Hamilton’s position in favor of the bank eventually won, but there were strong
statements of the contrary positions by Edmund Randolph and by Thomas
Jefferson. Yet they all were very familiar with what had just happened. They
had different intentions and expectations. Maybe meaning helps us there.
Maybe we can find something dispositive at the level of meaning.
Finally, as Professor Pildes has pointed out, there are contexts in which the
original intentions and expectations are going to lead to very unpalatable results.
For example, the people who wrote and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment
almost certainly did not intend the Equal Protection Clause of its Section One to
require sex equality.24 We can have confidence in that assessment because they
expressly included permission for sex discrimination in favor of men with
respect to voting in Section Two of the very same Fourteenth Amendment.

24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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There are other examples of immoral results from associating the
Constitution’s meaning too closely with the intentions and expectations of its
framers and ratifiers. Consider Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott. He
says African Americans can’t be citizens because that was the intention,
understanding, and expectation of virtually everybody who was politically active
in the late eighteenth century.25 You can escape some of these normative
problems by moving to original public meaning because original public meaning
necessarily operates at a much higher level of abstraction. Indeed, the vagueness
of meaning is a feature, not a bug. It’s what enables a consensus to form in favor
of words even when there is disagreement about what people intend or expect
from words.
Thus I agree with the self-styled originalist scholars who pushed away from
expectations and intentions to original public meaning, because doing so does
solve some of the core problems with intentions and expectations. But it does
so at substantial cost. The main cost is that the level of generality that one needs
to go to in order to locate consensus in the late eighteenth century or the postCivil War period, if you’re talking about the Reconstruction Amendments, is so
abstract as to be very substantially underdeterminate in concrete cases. That’s
also true of the level of abstraction you need to avoid the sorts of odious results
that intentions and expectations yield.
Once you go to that higher level of abstraction, however, originalism becomes
virtually indistinguishable from living constitutionalism. This is why Professor
Jack Balkin was able to write a book with the title Living Originalism, in which
he argues that originalism and living constitutionalism are opposite sides of the
same coin.26 Ronald Dworkin said that same thing in a book he wrote in the
mid-1990s. He said that if you define originalism simply as what the Framers
intended to say as opposed to what other intentions and expectations they may
have had, then originalism is consistent with his view.27
Professors William Baude and Stephen Sachs take the view that originalism
is already our law, because once you understand that originalism only operates
at a very high level of abstraction and you see courts not professing to contradict
the original understanding, you’ve got originalism.28 Yet if the way to save
originalism is to render it equivalent to living constitutionalism in virtually all
concrete cases that we really care about, then the answer to the question why or
why not be an originalist is “who cares?” That is to say, if we are all originalists
but originalism is no longer a distinctive position, there’s really nothing at stake.
I’ll nonetheless conclude by offering one reason why we ought to care. I think
that sophisticated audiences, like the people in this room and the people on this
25. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 426–27 (1857).
26. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011).
27. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 291 (1996).
28. William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, Grounding Originalism, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1455,
1476–77 (2019).
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panel, understand the difference between original public meaning and original
intentions and expectations. And usually when they talk about originalism they
mean original public meaning, although there are contexts of course, like
Professor Prakash’s example, where it’s better to be a subjective intentionalist
originalist. You want to honor your grandfather’s wishes and not smoke
marijuana.
Still, despite that example, the overall the argument for constitutional
interpretation has generally shifted and, I think, been pretty decisively won by
the original public meaning originalists. However, if you look at the public
discourse, you see something else. Consider confirmation hearings for Supreme
Court justices. Or consider impeachment proceedings about which I’ll say a
little more during the comments. In these public settings, you routinely see
legislators, and even judges and justices, resorting to expectations and
intentions. You even see this phenomenon from jurists that you think would
know better. In an article I wrote some years ago, I gave examples of Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas talking the talk of original public meaning, but then
in particular cases using concrete intentions and expectations.29
Thus one reason why you might not want to call yourself an originalist is that,
although you may have in mind the legitimate original public meaning version
that’s equivalent to living constitutionalism, when you make arguments that
justify originalism, you will thereby license politicians, judges, and justices to
use the discredited form of originalism. And of course, we don’t want people to
be acting dishonestly in that way.
I’ve got lots more to say, so hopefully someone will ask me during the Q&A,
“What else were you going to say, Professor Dorf?”
[Laughter and applause]
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Well, that was terrific. Why don’t we start
by giving the panelists an opportunity to respond, if they wish, to anything said
by their co-panelists? Judge Barrett, do you want to begin?
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Sure, I will. I actually think that Professor
Prakash and I don’t disagree about whether originalism is a theory of
interpretation or normative theory of justification. For me, it is both. My
position is that, if, for reasons of popular sovereignty, you accept the proposition
that the Constitution is law, then it follows that the original public meaning of
the text is law. I’m also persuaded by the Will Baude and Steve Sachs argument
that we treat the Constitution’s original meaning as law as a positive matter.30
(Related to that point, I think Professor Prakash’s example of members of
Congress invoking original meaning in the impeachment proceedings shows that
our public officials, not just our courts, treat the Constitution as law. But I

29. Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2020–22 (2012)
(book review).
30. Baude & Sachs, supra note 28, at 1487.
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digress.) The popular sovereignty and positivist arguments are reasons why one
might say, as I do, that the original meaning of the text is law.
That said, I agree with Professor Prakash that the normative and interpretive
aspects can be disaggregated. In other words, one can believe in originalism as
a method of interpretation without taking a position on whether the text is law.
As Professor Prakash said, “Originalism is the natural way to interpret words.”
That is true whether or not the words are law.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Oh, you want me to follow up? I also
agree with Judge Barrett. And we had a phone call before our talk today. And
she said something worth repeating—I don’t know if it made it into your
comments—but originalism is not about rules versus standard. It’s not about
judicial restraint. It’s not about being against rights. It’s not about any of those
things. It’s a method of interpretation.
I think Professor Dorf is right that some people may have glommed on to
originalism originally for those sorts of purposes, but there’s no way that you
can know ex ante whether the Constitution systematically favors rules versus
standards or systematically favors judicial restraint. So I agree with the
comments that Judge Barrett made in our private conversation.
[Laughter]
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Which is not very private. Professor Pildes?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, I was surprised by Sai Prakash’s
comments because I’m trying to understand what’s at stake if the only question
is whether originalism is an appropriate method of interpretation, as a matter of
what seems like literary theory, if you don’t think anything normative follows
for law once you identify a “correct” method of interpretation. His approach
seems, if I understand it, disconnected from the reason we discuss and debate
these interpretive issues because we’re talking about how the Constitution
should be interpreted to apply to some of the most charged issues in American
democracy.
But if you take Sai’s view that his analysis of originalism as a method of
reading a text still leaves us completely free to decide what the appropriate
normative theory of constitutional application is that follows, and that there’s
nothing about originalism as he analyzes it that dictates anything about that
question, then I’m left a little surprised about what it is we’re exactly debating
here and why it matters. So if you could say more about that, I would appreciate
it.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Sure. I think I get nervous when I tell
people that they have to believe something, and they have to do something, and
I—
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: —You should be a computer scientist then!
[Laughter]
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: And I get nervous when people tell me
that I have to accept the Warren Court’s jurisprudence or Justice Kennedy’s
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jurisprudence or anyone’s jurisprudence as a matter of law. So you’re right that
my claim is narrow. I think it’s helpfully narrow. I think if you’re going to tell
people that they have to believe that the country can’t do X or must do Y, you’ve
got to have a normative theory. I think you’re right that some people have a
normative theory, and you can judge it.
People who are originalists have given us reasons they believe should compel
us to follow the original meaning. I don’t have such a theory because I’m wary
of telling you what you should or shouldn’t do. I’m not in the business of telling
you what you should or shouldn’t do. So for that reason my claim is more
narrow. I agree.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I just want to make two points. The first one
continues my earlier remarks but using the example of impeachment. I think
that Professor Prakash is exactly right about who will be making what
arguments, that these arguments will be roughly the inverse of the positions that
the parties took with respect to the Clinton impeachment, that the votes will
largely reflect the political priors of the members of the House and the Senate,
and that what this shows is that arguments about original understanding are not
determinative, or at least not used in a way that is determinative.
Yes, originalism is the rhetorical envelope into which people can fit their
normative priors, but that doesn’t mean that original meaning is actually doing
the work. We should distinguish between what people say and their actual
motivations. Now you might say, well, it’s understandable that politicians
would use original meaning simply to justify their priors, but the same thing is
true of Supreme Court Justices. The overwhelming empirical evidence we have
from the political science literature on the Court tells us that the single greatest
determinant of how Justices vote is their ideological priors. That’s true whether
they call themselves originalists, living constitutionalist; whether they follow
Ely, whether they follow somebody else. That evidence strongly suggests that
originalism is merely a rhetorical move. It’s not a method for deciding cases.
Now, the way that I think the best originalist scholars deal with the underdeterminacy problem is to use a distinction that Keith Whittington has
expounded between interpretation, which is what Professor Prakash was talking
about—just what the words mean—and construction, which allows judges and
others to fill gaps.
Randy Barnett and Evan Bernick have a paper that suggests that even in the
construction zone, judges are at least somewhat constrained.31 I think that’s an
admirable normative view. However, I don’t think one sees evidence of such
constraint in the actual practices of judges and justices. Thus I end up thinking
that originalism is not actually doing any real work in the world.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Let me jump in and defend the judges. If our
priors are so important, then how do you account for the remarkable number of
31. Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, The Letter and the Spirit: A Unified Theory of
Originalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1, 5–6 (2018).
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unanimous opinions on the Supreme Court and even more remarkable number
of 3-0 panel opinions on the courts of appeals among judges whose priors are so
different?
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: In many of those cases, the ideological stakes
are low or very difficult to identify. In addition, much of the agreement may
reflect shared values across ideology. I’m a liberal; most of you in the audience
are conservative, but we have much in common. I like you people. We’re in
many ways the same. We went to the same schools. We send our kids to the
same schools. We’re not that different. You’re part of the same social world.
There’s not that much difference between libertarians and civil libertarians. I
think a lot of the consensus is actually rooted in ideological agreement. It’s only
when you have ideological disagreement that I think priors become important.
And of course, I’m not a nihilist. I do think law has some constraining force.
So the question is what’s going to happen where ideology becomes very, very
highly salient. And then I just think that there’s no evidence that originalism or
any other methodology is doing real work.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Just to respond to Professor Dorf’s
comment about what’s going on with respect to impeachment, I think he’s
absolutely right, descriptively. People are going to flip 180 degrees this time
around. But it seems to me that’s hypocrisy. What’s that old statement that
hypocrisy is the tribute that vice pays to virtue? And the virtue is they
understand that to make sense of the Constitution, you should understand what
the people writing the Constitution and ratifying it, the ratifiers, what they took
it to mean, what it would have meant at the time.
So they’re making the right sort of argument. They’re just humans. They do
what everyone else does. They try to use arguments in their favor. The fact that
none of us are able to perfectly hew to any particular theory doesn’t mean that
the theory’s wrong. You might say you shouldn’t lie, or you shouldn’t steal, but
some people might find themselves in a situation where they have to steal
because they’re starving. And I don’t know if that means that the theory is
wrong. It just means that people can’t be expected to be perfect, certainly not
the people in the halls of Congress, with all due respect to the people in the halls
of Congress.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Professor Pildes, if I took it down right—
he’ll correct me if I didn’t—you indicated that some large domains of our
constitutional law are neither originalist or, in some cases, are anti-originalist.
Do any of the panelists, particularly perhaps Judge Barrett or Professor Prakash,
but also Professor Dorf, would you like to agree or disagree or modify that
claim?
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I think he’s absolutely right, and he
gave us various options. My view is that much of the jurisprudence about
democracy is not grounded in the Constitution. I don’t think equi-populous
districts are required by the Republican Guarantee Clause, unlike Professor
McConnell. Remember the Senate is certainly gerrymandered in a sense. I’m
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wondering what’s to prevent a litigant, say Eric Holder, going to court and
saying the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment renders the Senate unconstitutional.
Now, I heard someone laugh. But that argument could be made. And if it’s
accepted by the Court twenty years from now, enough people might think it’s
not a bad or silly idea. My point is that’s just not an originalist reading of the
Constitution. The laughter is an artifact of the fact that such an argument hasn’t
been made and it hasn’t been accepted. But it could equally made of the Senate,
just like it was made of the state legislatures.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I would just add that what Professor Pildes says
is true of the law of democracy is also true of most of the law of the First
Amendment. There is pretty good evidence that the First Amendment, as
originally understood with respect to freedom of speech, implied the Zenger
principles32 in defamation cases and probably forbade prior restraints. Maybe
there’s a good argument that the Sedition Act was unconstitutional under the
First Amendment, but much of modern First Amendment law, including all of
the campaign finance regulation doctrine, goes much further than that.
I’m not going to say that the bulk of modern First Amendment doctrine is
necessarily anti-originalist, but you can’t derive it from the original
understanding. The best you can do is to say that if we understand freedom of
speech at a suitably high level of generality, then the modern doctrine is
consistent with it. That is the second move that Professor Pildes described. And
I think that it fairly characterizes a great deal of our modern constitutional law,
which raises a question for the defenders of originalism: Do you envision
originalism as a theory of reform—that is, as what the courts and others ought
to be doing—or as a currently descriptively accurate theory? That could be a
question for Judge Barrett and Professor Prakash.
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Well, I won’t give a complete answer to
your question, but the examples that you gave of the First Amendment are about
expected applications. You’re saying that, at the time, people thought that many
of these things were unconstitutional—but, as you pointed out in your remarks,
originalists don’t consider the expected applications to be binding. The
Constitution lays down some rules, and it lays down some standards. The First
Amendment is partly a standard, and people in the founding era may have been
wrong about how it applied in particular circumstances. So some of your
examples might not be inconsistent with the original understanding. I haven’t
done the work in those particular areas.
But I don’t think it makes originalism meaningless to say that, for some things,
like free speech, the content may be at a high enough level of generality that
we’re going to disagree about what it requires. Originalism doesn’t proport to
give an answer to every question, nor does it hold itself out as making all
32. See A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH
TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 675 (T. B. Howell, ed., 1813).
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constitutional questions easy. I mean, Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed. So
I guess I’m there with you. I will accept that, yes, originalism doesn’t answer
every question, and it sometimes operates at a high level of generality—but
those are features of the constitutional text.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I guess I would add, I think, Professor
Dorf, you mentioned the role that the precedent plays. And I think Justice Scalia
understood precedent as sort of an extra non-constitutionally grounded factor
that he would use to decide cases. And that certainly suggests there’s something
more than originalism going on. And the question is, well, why can’t there be
still more beyond those two things?
There are scholars who claim that part of the judicial power included some
requirement to consider precedent. John McGinnis and Michael Rappaport and
I think my colleague Caleb Nelson have written along these lines.33 So there’s
a dispute amongst originalists about what role precedents should play in
adjudication. You’re quite right that if you have the view, as some originalists
do, that judges should not consider precedent, then judges who consider it aren’t
being strict originalists.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I want to clarify one point about my remarks.
I am not defending here what some scholars call living constitutionalism, per se.
I’m not saying anything about many of the Constitution’s individual rights
provisions and how they should be interpreted or whether there should be
unenumerated rights as a general matter. For purposes of our discussion today,
I’m trying to resist framing the choice as one between originalism or nonoriginalism across the board. Instead, I am putting forward the more modest
argument that, at least in some domains, non-originalism plays a role that is not
broadly challenged. We have good reasons for being non-originalists in the area
of “the law of democracy.” Most of the Court accepts non-originalism in those
domains. But that’s not a broad argument for living constitutionalism and a
rejection of originalism across the board. I want to carve this down to that
narrower focus to understand better how originalists respond to the powerful
non-originalist nature of much of the law of democracy.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Does that mean you’d agree that originalism
should be, as I think Professor Prakash wrote, the default rule? But when it does
violence to the law of democracy, then the judge should move in a different
direction?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, I’m persuaded by a lot of what
Professor Dorf says about the difficulty of pinning down exactly what is meant
by originalism, both among academics and among judges and, to the extent
there’s a conflict between the two, what choice I would make. I certainly agree

33. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103
NW. U.L. REV. 803, 803–04 (2009); Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous
Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2001).
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that all judges should take into account the text of the Constitution. Where the
text is determinate, it applies.
No one thinks to litigate the constitutionality of the Senate, for example, even
though the population disparity between the largest and smallest states today
vastly exceeds the institution the Framers created. When the Senate was first
formed, the disparity in population between the largest and smallest state was
thirteen to one—and that’s if you count the enslaved people in Virginia who
were not permitted to vote. If you actually count people who were eligible to
vote, the disparity was about six to one between the largest and smallest state.
Now that population disparity is something like seventy to one, California to
Wyoming.
So the institution has changed quite dramatically in terms of the
representational basis for it. But even so, no one thinks to bring that case. No
one thinks they would win such a case. Similarly with the Electoral College, I
find it hard to believe we would adopt that today on a clean slate. I don’t know
exactly what we would adopt instead. But no one’s arguing it’s unconstitutional.
It’s just not a winning argument and we understand why: it’s written into the
text of the Constitution itself.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: Let me just say a word about that. Professor
Balkin has a useful metaphor for thinking of this. He talks about arguments that
are off the wall versus arguments that are, and here he coined a phrase, “on the
wall.”34 The argument that the Senate is unconstitutional is currently off the
wall. But of course, what makes an argument off the wall is not simply the
semantic content of the constitutional text. A lot of it is social understanding.
So it’s not currently off the wall to say that money is legal tender. That claim
would have been regarded as off the wall early in the nineteenth century, but
now the idea that paper money is legal is very much on the wall. Indeed, a
challenge to paper money would be off the wall. How did the shift occur? It
was a result of the felt necessities of the times, economic pressures, and all sorts
of other extra-legal considerations that pushed an argument from being off the
wall to on the wall.
However, I want to emphasize again that I’m not a nihilist. I think that there
are some words that are so determinate that there will be positions that are
permanently off the wall. But a lot of what we now think of as off the wall is
not off the wall because it’s so much more of a textual stretch than a lot of the
doctrines we actually have. And that includes doctrines that conservatives like,
as well as doctrines that liberals like.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: My aim is not to get the Senate
declared unconstitutional. I completely agree with Professor Dorf that, right
now, that argument’s off the wall. But if thirty percent of the country comes to
believe it, in part for instrumental reasons, it’s no longer off the wall. And let
34. JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST
WORLD (2011).
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me give you another off the wall argument that’s not off the wall anymore, which
is that the death penalty is unconstitutional even though the Constitution talks
about depriving someone of life, liberty, or property. The notion that the Senate
is unconstitutional seems inconceivable where we sit now, but a lot of things
were inconceivable twenty years ago that have come to pass.
I know that Professor Pildes denies that he favors living constitutionalism.
That’s fine. I want to say that I favor, as a policy matter, one person, one vote.
I’m not saying that I’m against it. But I’m against the idea that the Constitution
has to solve all of our problems and that whatever we really feel strongly about
we have to find within the Constitution. The Constitution was not a perfect
document when it was made. We know that because it basically fostered slavery
by giving the South more representation in the House and by allowing the South
to have a disproportionate role in the selection of presidents. There was the
Virginia series of presidents because of the three-fifths clause.
The Constitution is not perfect today. So it’s quite true that if you’re an
originalist you have to question or perhaps jettison several Supreme Court
precedents. But they’re doing that anyway. They’ve been doing that for
hundreds of years. One final comment I think for Professor Dorf about
originalism, there’s the word originalism and there’s the concept. So maybe the
word was coined in the sixties or seventies. I don’t really know. That would be
an interesting study. But I think early constitutional jurisprudence was
originalist in the sense that they did not believe that the meaning of words should
change over time or the meanings of provisions should change over time.
I believe my colleague Ted White has said this about the period before the
progressive era. And I think that’s an accurate assessment of what was going
on. There were differences of opinion about what the Constitution meant. There
were serious differences of opinion, but they were still bounded by this notion
that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed. They were just trying to take
advantage of whatever ambiguities they saw in it.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I mostly agree with that, although I would point
out that the original meaning is not playing a determinative role in those cases.
It is generally thought that the Marshall Court engaged in what Charles Black
later called structural interpretation.35 A lot of his decisions were controversial.
What was he doing? He had a nationalist and, in some sense, Court-empowering
agenda. He pursued that agenda while saying that he was just applying the fixed
meaning of the Constitution because the fixed meaning of the Constitution turns
out to be very underdeterminate on the questions that are most highly contested.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: So again, I want to resist having these debates
cast as you are saying, that the Constitution means anything you like because, at
least with respect to the argument I’m trying to make, there’s a much more
specific set of issues I’m trying to address. That issue is how can the outcomes
of a democratic process be accepted as legitimate—why should courts defer to
35. CHARLES L. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
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them—if the democratic process itself is manipulated in such a way by those in
power to insulate themselves from the kind of political competition that is
essential to making the process of self government—of free and fair elections—
legitimate?
When those who temporarily are vested with political power manipulate the
framework for future elections, it is often difficult for the rest of us to restructure
that process from the inside precisely because those are the elected officials to
whom you would have to appeal to end these distortions of democracy. The
argument that these manipulations violate fundamental principles of democratic
self-government under the Constitution is a very specific argument for why nonoriginalism in this area is justified—and why we have such a strong body of
non-originalist constitutional law in this area.
As I say, Justice Scalia distilled this notion down in a very powerful way, as
he often did, with that line about the instinct of power being the retention of
power.36 So I think at least for me, that’s what I’m asking you to think about. I
want non-originalists to think about this domain and to ask themselves hard
questions about how originalism does or should apply in this domain, if at all.
Do originalists want to follow Judge Bork and abandon all of this law, or do they
want to find some other accommodation with this body of law, and, if so, what
the terms of accommodation ought to be.
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: I’ll add one thing. I think that part of
Professor Dorf’s objection is that originalism can’t yield determinate answers.
As I said before, I don’t think that’s what’s on offer. But that’s true of all
constitutional theories. There’s always going to be disagreement about what the
Constitution requires, no matter what interpretive approach you take. So I don’t
think that’s a fatal flaw in originalism. I think that’s just the reality on the
ground: constitutional law, especially in the set of cases that make it to the
Supreme Court, involves indeterminacy and some disagreement.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I agree with that, that all the theories on offer
are vastly underdeterminative. I do think that, at least in public debate,
originalism is often sold as much more determinate than it is as part of a rule-oflaw agenda. So one reason why I don’t want to use the word originalism,
although I don’t so much object to the concept, is precisely to avoid this kind of
confusion in public debate about how much work is being done by the theory of
meaning versus construction and so forth.
Here’s a possible answer to Professor Pildes’s question, but it is not along the
dimension of originalism versus non-originalism. It comes from your colleague
Jeremy Waldron, who says that the problem with Ely-style representationreinforcing judicial review is that it doesn’t have a natural stopping point
because there are lots of controversial theories about democracy.37 Moreover,
36. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 263 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
37. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
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Waldron says, courts aren’t necessary to police democracy. England got rid of
the rotten boroughs through legislative action. So, he says, it’s possible to use
majoritarian processes to cure the majoritarian defects. Now, maybe the answer
to Waldron is that possible does not mean certain. If the system becomes too
undemocratic, it will be too late for anyone to do anything about it, because by
then you’ve got the Brownshirts in the streets.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Yes. And it’s certainly true, as Judge Barrett
said. And I would agree with her on this, that most theories on offer of
constitutional interpretation have—as my colleague from Israel, Professor
Joseph Weiler, likes to say, every border has its guerrillas. Every theory has its
boundary problems. And that’s certainly true of representation-reinforcing
approaches to judicial review. And of course, it could be a danger, too, because
it can lead courts to do things that they ought not to do in the name of preserving
the democratic process under the Constitution.
But, as with all of these theories, we’re faced with a choice. Do we abandon
this central role for the Court and just live with distortions like massive
malapportionment of legislative districts for seventy years, as was the case?
Based on the belief, or hope, that eventually Congress or some other actor might
take care of the problem? I think that’s exactly what Supreme Court thought in
the 1940s when it stayed out of these issues in the Colegrove v. Green case;38
England around that time was adopting independent boundary commission to
draw its district and I think the Court, or at least members like Justice
Frankfurter, thought the United States might soon do the same. But then, after
another twenty years went by with nothing changing, and as these population
disparities grew greater and greater, even Justices who had not been inclined for
the Court to get involved finally decided fundamental principles of democratic
self-government required them to get involved.
So yes, the barriers to change can be extremely high within the existing
structure when it’s been manipulated to protect incumbent powers. Might you
eventually be able to change it with enough public pressure in some context?
Yes, if most of politics gets devoted to that. But I don’t think that that justifies
those structures. I don’t think it’s an argument for courts staying out of this
altogether. I think that we are better off for the body of law, even though I
disagree with some of it.
The question is not adopting some ideal theory of democracy. It’s saying that
certain manipulations of democracy that can only be justified by nothing more
than naked political self-interest, rather than any legitimate public policy
purpose, become unconstitutional. That leaves lots of room for different theories
and different approaches to democracy. It’s not, of course, imposing one vision.
It’s saying that certain manipulations are off limits.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: But how do judges know what those
manipulations are? Should we know it when we see it?
38. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, the courts have decided, for example,
that ballot access laws in presidential elections that require a non-major party
candidate, like John Anderson back in the 1980 election, to get enough
signatures to get on the ballot one year before the election—before you even
know who the major party candidates are—violate the First Amendment because
they impose an unjustifiable burden on non-party candidates.39 I assume, by the
way, this same doctrine is going to be the basis for the Court striking down
California’s effort to require presidential candidates to disclose their tax returns
in order to be listed on the ballot.
It’s going to be this same body of law that says ballot access rules can become
unconstitutional when they impose severe burdens, without adequate
justification, particularly in presidential election contests. The Court has been
explicit in acknowledging that there’s no litmus test for making these
judgements. It’s a balancing of burdens and justifications, as in many areas of
the law. But there is—over time, we accrue precedents, and later cases work to
figure out how best to apply those decisions to new contexts. No one argues this
is straightforward and mechanical, but it’s what courts do.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: All right. Let me throw a question from left
field. We’ve been talking about methods of interpretation, and obviously
textualism is a critical part of the originalism discussion. What do our panelists
think, if they have thought about it at all, about addressing Professor Prakash’s
stay off the grass hypothetical by having recourse to corpus linguistics to figure
out whether grandpa was talking about marijuana or the lawn?
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: Well, even corpus linguistics isn’t going to
answer every question—language, as Professor Prakash pointed out, is a social
construct and it depends on context. Modern textualism and modern originalism
accept that. So I imagine that if you plug in “stay off the grass” into a corpus
linguistics database, you may well generate answers that are both “stay off the
green stuff on the lawn” as well as “stay off of pot.”
We know which one it is because of the grandfather being a drug addict in the
1970s. It was the context of the situation that answered the question. So I don’t
think that interpretation, whether we’re talking about statutes or the Constitution,
is a kind of mechanical exercise where you can look in dictionaries or even a
corpus linguistics database to generate every answer.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: If you’re going to be an originalist in
constitutional interpretation or an original textualist in statutory interpretation,
then corpus linguistics can be helpful, especially for identifying idiomatic usages
or terms of art. I do think that one can run away with this approach and that
often, the game isn’t worth the candle because you go so far deep into the weeds
that you lose sight of the fact that the language is underdeterminate. But one
thing that I think you find if you do this work is that the line between subjective
39. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802, 805–06 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30–32 (1968).
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intentions/expectations on one side and meaning on the other gets a little blurred
because language is a social act, and so it’s often hard to separate meaning from
intentions. This is a point Stanley Fish has made in his intentionalist phase that
the line that I highlighted, that people have drawn between meaning as an
objective fact about language and subjective intentions and expectations, is not
necessarily coherent in light of our best theories of language.40
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: We’re going to have final comments from
our panelists, but I’m going to invite the audience to line up at our two
microphones. I do want to give folks a chance for questions. Go ahead,
Professor Pildes.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I was just going to say that one of the things
that we have to be careful of with textualism or corpus linguistics—and I do
agree it has value—is that, precisely because language is social, it’s used always
in a particular context. So you have to know when you see certain words what
were they being used against. To make this concrete, let me use this recent
example from the Constitution. The Constitution, in the Elections Clause, gives
the power to the “legislatures” of the states to do various things in the first
instance, such as regulate the manner of national elections.41
Now, when the Framers used the word “legislature,” what did that word mean
to them or the public at the time? I think it’s pretty clear they were considering
where to place that power among the other institutional possibilities that existed
at the time and that they would have had in mind. They debated whether to give
this power to Congress or to the states. And since courts and executives existed
at the time and were being made part of the structure of government, the word
“legislature” made clear that it was not courts or the executive who would have
this power.
But today we get to a question that simply could not have been posed when
these terms were written and that no one would have understood themselves to
be addressing. The question is, if a state constitution chooses to give the voters
of he state lawmaking power, through voter-initiated direct democracy, and the
voters decide that independent districting commissions designating elections
districts will better serve democracy, does the Elections Clause deny voters the
power to make this choice? Must this power always remain in the hands of the
state legislatures, no matter how corruptly a majority of citizens come to believe
that power is being used, absent a constitutional amendment. Or, given the
context in which the word “legislature” was put into the Elections Clause, is that
term best understood to mean the lawmaking process a state uses, which in the
modern era has come to include, in some states, direct democracy?

40. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s
Purposive Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109, 1129–33 (2008).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
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That was the question the Supreme Court faced in the Arizona Independent
Redistricting,42 where the Court in a sharply divided 5-4 vote held that voters,
acting as legislators through direct democracy, could determine the “manner” of
structuring election-district design. You can look at corpus linguistics all you
want to decide how “legislature” was used in 1789, but because the social
context in which that word was used at the time didn’t include the option of
direct popular lawmaking—that just was not one of the options on the table—
then if corpus linguistics didn’t identify anyone who referred to “legislature” as
including voter initiatives when voters were part of the lawmaking process of a
state, then the Framers must have meant to deny voters the power to regulate the
“manner” of national elections, even though no one gave any thought to a
question that would have been unintelligible at the time. I think when we use
resources like corpus linguistics, we have to be careful to understand the social
context in which words were used at the time, in order to be faithful to what the
drafters of language understood themselves to be doing and how the public
would have understood those words. That’s true whether you’re an originalist
or not: words alone need to be understood in the context in which they are being
used.
To further illustrate some of the complexity regarding this specific issue,
states have enacted many laws that regulate the national election process. And
as far as I know, when the governor normally has a veto power over ordinary
legislation, he also has that same veto power over this type of legislation. The
governor is part of the lawmaking process, and legislatures have not generally
even claimed that the governor has no power over state laws that regulate ballot
access, or the use of absentee ballots, in national elections. So if you ask what
has the historical practice been about whether only “the legislature” can play any
role in regulation of national elections under the Elections Clause, the historical
practice is that “legislature” has meant the lawmaking process of the state. I’m
not arguing which side of this particular debate is right. I’m identifying a
concern that even textualists need to be aware of the social context in which
words were drafted to give them their proper meaning, including when using
corpus linguistics.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Any final comments before we go to
questions? No? Okay. Recognizing that the last shall be first, I’m going to start
with the—I wish I could see. I think there’s a lady at the microphone there.
Okay. Please, your question. And please, keep your questions as short as you
can, and let’s do sort of a lightning round here so everyone gets a chance to ask
their question. Ma’am?
QUESTIONER 1: So I first wanted to say thank you for coming to speak to
current law students like myself. It’s very helpful in class discussions and
everything. But I also wanted to ask about your opinions on the effects of the

42. Ariz. State Legis. v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2677 (2015).
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kind of pro-socialism movement on the sustainability of this originalism
ideology in the next coming years.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: I think Michael’s closest to being appropriate
for that question.
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: It sounds like a law of democracy kind of
question to me.
QUESTIONER 1: It’s a hard question.
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: In America and in other, major established
democracies, we are facing more populist forms of politics, in versions from
both the right and the left, that we haven’t experienced through most of our
history here, or in post-World War II history. I have no idea how any of these
forces will play out, which of these forces will prevail, how they’ll get moderated
if they ever gain power.
I don’t know how to link those still unfolding developments to originalism in
constitutional interpretation. But what I can say is the American system of
separated powers and staggered elections for the House, the Senate, the
presidency, makes it very difficult for ideological forces to capture all of
government unless there’s fairly sustained support over a substantial period of
time. So yes, you could imagine all sorts of forces coming to power and putting
pressure on various constitutional understandings. But I think we have a pretty
robust and resilient system, and so I’ll leave it at that.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I’ll take a crack at it. I’m not a socialist of any
kind, but first I’d say that the people in the U.S. now who have gained some
traction call themselves democratic socialists. That’s supposed to be more like
Sweden in the 1970s than the Soviet Union at the same time. And then the
question is, is that consistent with the Constitution? In many respects, yes. In
Holmes’s phrase, the Constitution does not enact “Herbert Spencer’s Social
Statics,”43 so there’s plenty of room to do legislatively things that are quite
redistributionist.
There are limits, however. There is the Takings Clause. There are various
other protections for private property. I think it’s notable that the people now
calling themselves democratic socialists have not generally said that the
Constitution requires socialism, which is a view I think we would regard as off
the wall. But that view was almost on the wall in the early seventies. Frank
Michelman wrote a Harvard Law Review Foreword discussing ways in which
the Constitution might require redistribution.44 That position now seems like a
period piece, but there was a possibility of it becoming on the wall. So I think
the answer to the broader question of what happens to originalism or
constitutionalism in an era of democratic socialism is we don’t really know.

43. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
44. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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CHRIS GREEN: Chris Green from Ole Miss. Two questions, chiefly for
Professors Pildes and Dorf. Do we have the oldest currently operational
constitution in the world? And what is the object of the Article VI oath?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: We’re the longest continuous constitutional
democracy with a written constitution. So the U.K., as Judge Barrett said, of
course has operated under what they call an unwritten constitution or a set of
constitutional-like conventions. But in terms of continuous operation under a
written constitution, we are.
CHRIS GREEN: What is the object of the Article VI oath? When we swear
to support this Constitution, are we swearing to support the same thing that
George Washington did, given that Reynolds seems inconsistent with it?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, yes. We will still have arguments about
how to interpret and apply that Constitution, as the country always has, but of
course we’re supporting the same Constitution.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: Yeah. I’m not so sure.
[Laughter]
Part of the answer depends on what you think happened during
Reconstruction. The amendment processes used to enact the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments were mutually inconsistent with each other and
arguably inconsistent with Article V. Bruce Ackerman’s theory is that we
actually had a quiet revolution at the end of the Civil War.45 There is also a very
good book by Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton on comparative
constitutionalism regarding the longevity of constitutions.46 They find that easyto-amend constitutions tend to last longer. The U.S. Constitution is an outlier in
that it is very difficult to amend but has lasted for a very long time. Their
explanation is that flexible interpretation by the Court has enabled substantial
change without many formal amendments.
I don’t buy Ackerman’s view. I would say we have the same Constitution we
had in 1789, but only in the way that you are the same person you were when
you were an infant, even though all the atoms in your body are different. The
Constitution is like the ship of Theseus. We replace one plank at a time. Do we
have the same ship at the end of the day? In some sense yes, in another sense
no. That’s a very academic answer. I apologize for that.
[Laughter]
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Before we get into Heraclitus, never step in
the same river twice, let’s go to the rear microphone, please.
JOHN VORPERIAN: John Vorperian, Westchester County, New York.
Professor Prakash, I enjoyed the illustration, “Keep off the grass.” May I offer,
if ever called upon to operate a power plant, “Remember, you can never put too
much water into a nuclear reactor.”

45. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE, VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS 81–83 (1991).
46. ZACHARY ELKINS ET AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
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To the panel, I would ask, given the tenor of our political times and the
divisiveness, the heightened confrontation between left and right, does the
ascendency of originalism give impetus or the green light to political activists to
simply seek remedy via constitutional amendment?
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I’m sorry. Is the question whether we
can just change the Constitution to do what we want to do? Is that the question?
JOHN VORPERIAN: Essentially, in essence, yes, it is. Does it give political
activists of both left and right simply go out and seek amendment for their
particular paradigms?
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I’ll say something. I think the answer
is obviously yes. I think one of the reasons why we have so much amendment
outside of Article V is because Article V is just too difficult to navigate. So it
was an improvement over the Articles of Confederation, which required
unanimity, but it’s still very hard to amend the Constitution. We would have
more formal amendments if the Court didn’t amend the Constitution for us.
So I would say, given how difficult it is to amend the Constitution, it’s
understandable in some way that political movements try to channel their
amendments through the courts. If you’re going to make it impossible to do
something via this route, the water’s going to flow in the other direction.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: There is speculation that the Virginia
legislature is now going to ratify the ERA, which would be enough states to get
it over the top, assuming you treat the deadline that Congress initially imposed
and then extended and which then expired as non-operative. I don’t want to take
a position on whether the ratification is valid or not. I do think it’s interesting
that, if it happens, it will mean the last two amendments were both ratified long
after they were originally proposed.
The ERA would be nothing compared to the Twenty-seventh Amendment,
which was finally ratified in 1992, having been proposed in 1789. But I think it
says something about the difficulty of amendment that you can only actually get
amendments that are controversial in their day long after they’re no longer
controversial. And that should lead you to question the utility of the amendment
process.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Professor Barnett?
PROF. RANDY BARNETT: Hi, Randy Barnett from Georgetown Law. I
want to adjudicate a little bit the disagreement between Professor Prakash and
Judge Barrett on what originalism is. I think originalism is a family of theories
that surrounds two different propositions. The first is the fixation thesis, which
is that the meaning of the text of the Constitution is fixed at the time it’s enacted,
whatever that time may be. And the originalists disagree about exactly how and
why it’s fixed. That’s where you see differences between public meaning,
original methods, original law. That’s a disagreement about exactly how it’s
fixed, but they all agree that it is fixed. And that’s an empirical question. If you
believe it’s fixed, you think that the fixed meaning is empirically discoverable.
That’s what Professor Prakash was calling interpretation, I think, accurately.
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But there’s a second part of originalism, which is the constraint principle. And
that is that constitutional actors ought to follow or be constrained or be
influenced in their decisions by the fixed meaning of the Constitution. And
that’s not an empirical proposition. That’s a normative proposition. And there
are different reasons why originalists hold the second proposition, popular
sovereignty, rule of law, natural rights.
There’s different other—
consequentialism—theories for the second proposition as well. So there’s some
disagreements there. And I think that’s Judge Barrett’s view. So I think that
these views are ultimately reconcilable if you see that there are two components
of originalism, not just one.
The other brief point I wanted to make in response to Michael Dorf, level of
generality move, is that, in my experience, originalists—there’s a consensus that
most of the Constitution is relatively determinate: two senators, two houses of
Congress, presentment, a bunch of other stuff. Most of the Constitution is really
quite determinative. What the move is, is that the stuff we’re interested in, the
stuff we debate about, that’s the stuff that happens at a high enough level of
generality to be very underdeterminate or indeterminate. I think there’s a lot of
underdeterminacy.
But I think the more research one does into the more underdeterminate general
provisions—like the Equal Protections of the Laws Clause or the Due Process
of the Laws Clause or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause—the more
research you do, the more determinate it actually becomes. It’s not as thin a
meaning as non-originalists both assume and persist in assuming and insist on
assuming in order to give them more room to run. But that’s, of course, the
proof of the pudding of that is in the eating.
[Applause]
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Do you want to take the first point at all?
HON. AMY CONEY BARRETT: I don’t think I really have anything to add.
Professor Prakash?
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: I think Randy’s right. Most
originalists favor the original Constitution. But if you understand the first part
of Randy’s point, it’s possible to be an originalist who doesn’t like the original
Constitution as amended. And there’s nothing wrong with that, to say that.
Obviously, I like the original Constitution as amended, but I think Randy’s right
that there’s an interpretational aspect to originalism. And then there’s a
normative claim. But of course, as Randy well knows, people have different
normative arguments for why we should follow the Constitution.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I would characterize your point as the selection
bias idea. That is to say, we don’t see the ways in which the Constitution is
determinative because there’s a selection bias in contested cases for things that
are contestable, and that’s especially true as you go up to the U.S. Supreme Court
level because they’re going to take those cases that are most contestable. I fully
agree with that. That’s why, as I say, I am not a legal nihilist. I do think that
law is often quite determinate.
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Then, on this further question of what do you find when you look at the
original understanding, I agree as a general matter that it is possible that you will
discover that the original meaning is determinative on some point as to which
you thought it was underdeterminative. However, I don’t see evidence yet of
any Justices of the Supreme Court who claim to be originalist or originalist lite
actually doing that. If you you look at the empirical evidence, you see that
ideological priors are deciding the concrete cases.
Now, when I posted that point on my blog a couple years ago, Professor
Barnett’s colleague, Larry Solum, said that’s because there are no real
originalists on the Supreme Court.47 That move reminded me of what I used to
hear from communists in the days when there was communism. Noncommunists like me would say that every attempt to implement communism,
whatever one thinks of its ideals in theory, has resulted in totalitarian states that
trample on basic human rights.
And then my friends, or the people I was talking to, anyway—
[Laughter]
—would say, “Oh, those people aren’t real communists. They’re not really
faithful to the writings of Marx and Engels and so forth. They’ve perverted the
true ideals of communism.” It seems to me, at some point, you have to judge a
theory or an ideology by how it gets used in practice, whether that theory is
communism or originalism.
PROF. SAIKRISHNA B. PRAKASH: Just a quick response, I do think that
judges decide cases against their ideology. I recall Justice Thomas’s dissent in
the gay rights case where he said, “I think this is an uncommonly silly law.” 48
He’s quoting another Justice who was saying something similar about another
law. So I don’t think it’s the case that judges are just deciding on the basis of
their personal preferences about the content of the law.
I don’t think that’s true for the liberal Justices either. I think they’re often
deciding cases against their ideological preferences. I agree that their
ideological preferences might have some weight in their thinking because, again,
they’re human. And you can have a perfect theory, but when you put humanity
into it, it’s just not going to be implemented perfectly.
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: So Chris Eisgruber, who’s now the president of
Princeton, wrote a book back—it must have been close to twenty years ago—on
this question. One of the things that he says, which I actually think is very
accurate, is that a lot of the examples of Justices voting against their ideological
priors are actually not them voting against their ideological priors, because their
47. Lawrence Solum, Comments on Dorf on Originalism & Determinacy: Part One, Concepts
and
Terminology,
LEGAL
THEORY
BLOG
(Aug.
25,
2017,
5:11
PM),
https://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2017/08/comments-on-dorf-on-originalism-determinacypart-one-concepts-and-terminology.html; Michael Dorf, How Determinate is Originalism in
Practice?, DORF ON LAW (Aug. 25, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2017/08/howdeterminate-is-originalism-in.html.
48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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ideological priors are complex.49 For example, people often talked about Justice
Scalia voting in favor of criminal defendants in Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause cases, but perhaps that wasn’t Scalia simply following the text and
original understanding; perhaps Scalia’s ideological priors included criminal
justice libertarianism.
I think you see some of that in Justice Gorsuch who is proving to be a worthy
successor to Justice Scalia on criminal procedure cases. I like a lot of Justice
Gorsuch’s opinions in this area. I think he does a really nice job with them. But
I don’t think these are necessarily against type simply because we say he’s a
conservative. He’s a certain kind of conservative. He’s a libertarian
conservative in certain respects. That’s a perfectly respectable position, but it
means that Justice Gorsuch’s votes in favor of the rights of criminal suspects are
not contrary to his ideological priors.
But I agree with Professor Prakash that no Justice simply asks in any particular
case, “What is my first-order normative view about the best policy, and how do
I implement that in this case?” Rather, my claim based on the empirical
literature is that the ideological priors are doing a lot more work than the
jurisprudential skein in which the Justices wrap them.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Back microphone.
QUESTIONER 5: Thank you, your honor. This is specifically a question for
Mr. Pildes. I completely understand the concerns you’ve expressed that the law
of democracy is necessary in order to assure fair competition for power and that
there are real problems with the potential entrenchment of those in power to
avoid any check on their authority. I can’t help noticing, though, that that body
of law, as you’ve represented it, ceases the check on that of the judiciary, which
is, of course, the most entrenched and hardest to check of our branches.
That seems a bit of a problem especially in an era where, for several decades,
some judges have seemed to be adherents of judicial supremacy. So I ask, what
exactly would be the check on that entrenched power seeking to prevent any
check on itself?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: So that’s a great question. And something
implicit in what I have talked about and certainly implicit in the Court’s
development of this doctrine is that, in the United States, we do not have—have
not created, for the most part—institutions that a lot of other democracies have
to oversee the political process, if you will, or to take on various functions that
right now we have in the hands of sitting legislators. Many modern constitutions
themselves create certain independent institutions to set the ground rules for the
political process.
So we are the only country that uses election districts that allows the people
most self-interested in that process to draw the districts for themselves. I think,
as most other countries, as all other countries do, that’s an inherently
pathological situation. And you’re going to get what we see. It’s a very
49. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, THE NEXT JUSTICE 85 (2007).
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interesting question that fascinates me about why in the United States we have
been so unable to create various kinds of institutions to take on this role. And
we in the United States have this political culture, which I think does go fairly
deep in our DNA, that is just much more skeptical about creating these sorts of
independent or maybe bipartisan institutions to oversee parts of the electoral
process. If we had more of those institutions, I think you would see courts
playing less of this role.
It’s the absence in the U.S. of other institutions that can rein in politically selfinterested manipulations of the democratic process that has generated so much
pressure on courts to fill this gap, as they have. We have used the courts in that
way for a long time now, and the courts will continue to be pressed to play that
role in the absence of creating other institutions that might more appropriately
take on those tasks. But it’s, in the United States, a very difficult matter to get
people to accept the institutions that you’re talking about.
QUESTIONER 5: Just to be clear, who would guard us from the guardians?
PROF. RICHARD H. PILDES: Well, there’s no answer to that question. You
can ask that about any sets of institutions that are designed to create checks and
balances on other institutions. It goes all the way down. There’s no ultimate
guardian to guard us against the guardians that, in a democratic system, will not
potentially create similar kinds of risks of the ones that you’re raising. That’s
an inescapable problem. We do the best we can in designing institutions in a
way that hopefully minimizes that risk and have other institutions that also help
check and balance those institutions. But I think that’s the best any system can
do.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Ilya Shapiro?
ILYA SHAPIRO: Ilya Shapiro from Cato and it looks like, based on the time,
I might be the last question, which is somewhat apt because my question is
orthogonal to the panel’s topic, really. If this is about why we should be
originalists, well, that’s great. Most of us in this room probably already identify
as originalists, and we’re appreciative of the further support or adjustment to our
understanding of that. The law students here, I guess, have the most to gain from
that kind of perspective. But wouldn’t this panel be even better placed at an
ACS convention?
Because it seems like, to invoke Jack Balkin or, yesterday, Elizabeth Wydra
of the Constitutional Accountability Center, we’ve long been now, for a decade
or so, all have been textualists. Now, we’re sort of all becoming originalists.
And maybe ten years from now, the battle will be all among competing
originalists where the word originalist will no longer mean anything, and it’s
back to what’s the best method of constitutional interpretation or what have you.
So in the sense, if that comes to pass or to the extent that we’re seeing that trend
now, which could be reversed, and certainly could be reversed if the balance of
the courts is reversed, then will that mean a victory for originalism or would it
mean kind of a, well, we’re back to square one in that originalism means
whatever you want it to mean?
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Or as advanced by the new originalists, there’s now competing progressive
originalists, living originalists, as much as there are original meaning—the sort
of thing that we had in Heller,50 for example, to use practical purposes where
we’re all competing on the same battleground, which is healthy in a certain
sense.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: I’m looking at Professor Dorf because I
understood you to say that original public meaning has gotten to a level of
abstraction as to make it somewhat indistinguishable from living
constitutionalism. Is that the import to your question?
PROF. MICHAEL C. DORF: I think, Ilya, the point you make is true of most
concepts. To choose a more concrete example, think about the debate in
the Bakke case between the liberals and the conservatives, putting Justice Powell
aside for the moment.51 The question that divided them was whether race-based
affirmative action should be judged under the same strict scrutiny standard as
applies to conventional race discrimination, or should it be judged under
intermediate scrutiny? And the strict scrutiny team won that case.
But then, twenty years later, the people who lost said, “Well, it’s strict
scrutiny, but it’s not the same strict scrutiny that you apply in these other cases.”
Whenever there’s a victory for one side, the other side doesn’t go away. What
they do is they regroup and now they make the same kinds of arguments within
the new framework. So I think what you described is inevitable if it is true that
we are all originalists now. I think that’s probably true of lots of other areas of
the law, too.
HON. THOMAS HARDIMAN: Okay. Great. I have two tasks remaining as
the moderator. The first is to invite you to remain seated. Apparently, a brief
video will be played. I know not what it is, but one will be shown for your
pleasure. But before we do that, please join me in thanking our outstanding
panel.
[Applause]

50. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
51. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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